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THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008: DO THE
AMENDMENTS CURE THE INTERPRETATION
PROBLEMS OF PERCEIVED DISABILITIES?
Allison Ara*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act'
(ADA) in 1990 with the hope of eliminating discrimination on
the basis of disability.2 Congress aimed "to provide clear,
strong, consistent, [and] enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities,"3
however, courts failed to apply a broad standard.4 Supporters
of an extensive interpretation of the ADA vehemently
opposed these judicial interpretations, focusing their criticism
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sutton v.
United Air Lines.' In Sutton, the Court imposed harsh
limitations on those bringing ADA claims alleging they were
"regarded as" disabled under the Act's definition of
disability.7  Further, the circuits split over whether to
*Managing Editor of Volume 50 of the Santa Clara Law Review; J.D. Candidate
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University of California, Berkeley. I would like to thank our Board of Editors
and especially those who worked on my comment for helping to shape it into its
final form. Additionally, I would like to thank Nick Manov as well as my family
and friends for putting up with me throughout law school.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(2006) (amended 2008).
2. Id. § 12101(b)(1).
3. Id. § 12101(b)(2).
4. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 2(a)(3), 122
Stat. 3553, 3553.
5. See infra Part II.B.2-3.
6. This comment will use the phrases "regarded as" disabled and perceived
disability to refer to the third prong of the definition of disability, which states
"being regarded as having such an impairment." ADA Amendments Act sec.
4(a), § 3(1)(C).
7. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489-91 (1999). To
show that a plaintiff has an actual disability, he or she must have "a physical or
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interpret the ADA as granting reasonable accommodation to
those who were "regarded as" disabled, or to restrict this
grant to only those with actual disabilities.8 These decisions
left the circuits fractured and protection for those with
perceived disabilities extremely limited.'
In late 2008, Congress responded to these limitations by
passing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 ("the ADAAA" or
"the Amendments"), which supplemented the definition
of disability, but did not require covered entities to
reasonably accommodate those with perceived disabilities.' °
By superseding the Sutton decision, the additional definition
of perceived disability established a more inclusive
standard." Congress broadened group that can allege
discrimination based on perceived disability, 2 but narrowed
the remedies available to them." Although Congress
intended to provide courts with a clear and enforceable
standard, ambiguity remains.' 4  By retaining the original
definition of disability instead of changing the wording,
Congress failed to counteract all of the confusion that the
courts struggled with before passing the Amendments.
5
Additionally, the intent of Congress may perplex the courts
because it both broadened and restricted the protection
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities."
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a). The Sutton Court held that an individual who
successfully mitigated his or her impairment may not bring a perceived
disability claim under the ADA because his or her impairment did not
"substantially limit[] one or more major life activities." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487,
492. Before the Amendments superseded this decision, the United States
Supreme Court interpreted the terms in the definition of actual disability. ADA
Amendments Act sec. 2(b)(4)-(5); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534
U.S. 184 (2002). The Amendments added a section defining "major life
activities" which listed examples of activities that fulfill the definition. ADA
Amendments Act sec. 4(a), § 3(2). The Amendments also included an
explanation of how to interpret "substantially limits." Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(B)-
(E).
8. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489-94; see infra Part II.C.
9. See ADA Amendments Act sec. 2(a), § 3(3)-(7).
10. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3), sec. 6(a)(1), § 501(h).
11. Id. sec. 2(b)(2)-(5) (stating that a purpose of the ADAAA was to reject
the United States Supreme Court decisions in Sutton v. United Air Lines and
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams).
12. See id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3).
13. Id. sec. 6(a)(1), § 501(h).
14. Id. sec. 2(b)(1); see infra Part IV.A.
15. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4(a), § 3(1), 122
Stat. 3553, 3553; see infra Part IV.
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for those who are "regarded as" disabled. 6 Based on these
potential problems, courts may still misinterpret
congressional intent under the ADAAA.
This comment explores the background of the definition
of perceived disability and considers potential areas of
concern for future litigation. Part II discusses the history of
the "regarded as" prong of the definition of disability, from its
original inclusion in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to the
recent amendment of the ADA. 7 Part III identifies the
problem confronting the courts when interpreting the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008.8 Part IV will analyze the impact of
the Amendments along with the potential difficulties the
judiciary may face when interpreting the amended ADA. 9
Lastly, Part V will propose solutions for these difficulties, so
that a consistent standard may finally be reached.2"
II. BACKGROUND
The ADA defines a disabled individual as one who has "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities," "a record of such an
impairment," or one who is "regarded as having such an
impairment."21 This definition was originally included in the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to define handicap and was
interpreted thereunder.22 This section will track the history
of the third prong, from its original use in the Rehabilitation
Act to its current use in the ADA Amendments Act.23
A. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1974
Congress intended the Rehabilitation Act to prohibit
discrimination by federally funded state programs against
individuals with handicaps. 24  The Rehabilitation Act, as
16. See infra Part IV.B.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4(a), § 3(1), 122
Stat. 3553, 3555.
22. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 21 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 50
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332.
23. See infra Part II.A-D.
24. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 275 (1987).
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altered by the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974
defined handicap as "any person who (i) has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment,
or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."25
Congress intended for this definition to provide some
flexibility, without leaving the definition entirely open
to interpretation.2 6  Arguably, perceived disabilities were
intended to include those who were discriminated against,
regardless of whether they were handicapped under the
definition's other prongs.27
The United States Supreme Court interpreted this
definition of perceived handicap in School Board of Nassau
County, Florida v. Arline.21 There, an elementary school
teacher was discharged because of a relapse of tuberculosis.29
When she brought a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, the
district court refused to extend protection to an individual
with a contagious disease." Accordingly, the district court
denied relief by holding that she was not handicapped under
the Rehabilitation Act.3 ' Alternatively, the court held that
even if she were found to be handicapped under the
Rehabilitation Act, she was rightfully dismissed because she
was not qualified to teach elementary school.3 2 The court of
appeals reversed the district court's decision, holding that an
individual with a contagious disease was handicapped under
the Rehabilitation Act.33
In Arline, the Supreme Court adopted an expansive
25. Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Supreme Court's Decisions Discussing
the "Regarded As" Prong of the ADA Definition of Disability, 15
NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY 1, 2 (2003), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/pdf/regardedas.pdf.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284-85. After Ms. Arline was first diagnosis with
tuberculosis in 1957, the disease went into remission for the following twenty
years. Id. at 276. When she suffered three relapses in two years, the school
board suspended her, with pay, for the remainder of the school year. Id. She
was terminated at the end of the school year because of her relapses. Id.
Whether or not Ms. Arline was terminated because of her illness is not at issue,
since the district court decided on other grounds. Id.
29. Id.
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interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act's definition of
handicap. 4 The Court found that the inclusion of the
"regarded as" prong indicated a Congressional concern with
protecting individuals from discrimination based on outdated
and stereotypic laws and attitudes. 5  Therefore, the
Rehabilitation Act protected those who did not have an actual
incapacity as required by the other prongs, but were
"regarded as" having an impairment. 6 Furthermore, the
Court refused to distinguish between a condition
(tuberculosis) and the effects of the condition
(contagiousness). The Court reasoned that, if made, such a
distinction would allow the school board to fire Ms. Arline
because she was contagious without considering whether the
decision was motivated by discrimination based on her
disease. In sum, the Court found that "[t]he fact that some
persons who have contagious diseases may pose a serious
health threat to others under certain circumstances does not
justify excluding from coverage of the Act all persons with
actual or perceived contagious diseases."39
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The ADA, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, was the
first comprehensive declaration of equality for those with
disabilities. 40  It breezed through Congress with wide
margins,4 1 listing the provision of a "clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities" as well as "clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards of addressing
42AD deiediscrimination" among its purposes. The ADA defined
34. See generally School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,
279 (1987).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 282.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 285.
40. Steny H. Hoyer, Democratic Whip, House of Representatives, Tony
Coelho Lecture in Disability Employment Law and Policy: The Imperative-
and the Peril-of ADA Restoration (Oct. 21, 2004), available at
http://old.nyls.edu/docs/hoyerremarks.pdf.
41. Steny H. Hoyer, Not Exactly What We Intended, Justice O'Connor,
WASH. POST, Jan 20, 2002, at BO. The ADA passed with a margin of 403 to
twenty in the House and seventy-six to eight in the Senate. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1-2) (2006) (amended 2008).
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disability exactly as the Rehabilitation Act had defined
handicap." "The term 'disability' means, with respect to an
individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment."44 Despite having
the same definition, varied judicial decisions led to extensive
disagreement between the judiciary and the legislature. 5
1. Legislative Intent at the Time the ADA was Passed
Because legislators may have had different reasons for
passing the ADA and it was passed over fifteen years ago,46
its legislative history is difficult to divine. Regardless, the
Supreme Court relied on legislative intent when interpreting
the ADA.47 Ultimately, the ADAAA was passed as a means to
resolve the dispute between legislators and the Supreme
Court over the legislative intent.4"
Some contend that "the ADA was designed to extend
protection to people working in the private sector and seeking
access to the public accommodations, transit systems and
communication networks,"49 but the stated findings and
purposes,50 as well as other legislative documents, are more
reliable sources of the legislative intent at the time. The ADA
included a list of findings that stated that Congress was
attempting to counteract pervasive discrimination against
those with disabilities and create a national goal of
"assur[ing] equality of opportunity, full participation,
43. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 21 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 50
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332.
44. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4(a), § 3(1)(A)-
(C), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555.
45. See infra Part II.B.3.
46. Hoyer, supra note 41. Congressman Hoyer stated that it had been a
decade since the ADA was passed. Id. When the Amendments were passed, it
was over fifteen years. See id.
47. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 486 (1999)
(discussing the inclusion of the finding that forty-three million individuals had
disabilities indicated that Congress did not intend to include those who
mitigated their condition); School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 284 (1987) (indicating that Congress acknowledged that society's fears can
be damaging when it added perceived handicap to the Rehabilitation Act).
48. See infra Part II.B.3.
49. Hoyer, supra note 41.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006) (amended 2008).
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independent living and economic self-sufficiency."51  These
legislative documents clearly indicate that Congress intended
for the courts to interpret the "regarded as" prong of the
definition of disability in accordance with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Arline. 2 Congress emphasized the
portion of Arline that protected those with impairments that
do not substantially limit their functioning.53
Notwithstanding this background, the Court limited the
definition of perceived disability in Sutton, and spurned
harsh legislative backlash.54
2. Subsequent Treatment of Perceived Disability by the
United States Supreme Court
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. contains the Supreme
Court's controversial interpretation of the ADA's definition of
perceived disability.55 In Sutton, United Air Lines refused to
hire two sisters with severe myopia as commercial airline
pilots because they did not meet United's uncorrected vision
requirements.56  Although both sisters would have had
difficulty completing daily activities with uncorrected vision,
both women had 20/20 vision with corrective lenses and could
conduct ordinary tasks without difficulty. The district court
reasoned that, "[b]ecause petitioners could fully correct their
visual impairments ... they were not actually substantially
limited in any major life activity and thus had not stated a
claim that they were disabled within the meaning of the
51. Id. § 12101(a)(8)-(9).
52. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 53
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 335.
53. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23; H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(11), at 53.
54. See infra Part II.B.2-3; see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471 (1999).
55. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489-91. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky,
Inc. v. Williams was another case that interpreted the definition of disability
under the ADA. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). In Toyota, the Court defined "substantial"
and "major" as used in the ADA. Id. at 196-99. Although this case interpreted
the ADA, it did not examine issues that were directly pertinent to perceived
disability claims. See id. at 191.
56. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76. The sisters applied to United Air Lines for
positions after meeting United's age, education, certification, and experience
requirements. Id. Both sisters were invited to interview, but during the
interviews, they were told there had been a mistake in inviting them because
they did not meet the minimum vision requirements. Id. at 476.
57. Id. at 475.
20101
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ADA."58  The Tenth Circuit adopted the district court's
reasoning and affirmed its decision that the sisters were not
disabled under the ADA.59
The Supreme Court reasoned that there were two ways
that a person could be "regarded as" disabled.60 First, an
employer could mistakenly presume that an individual has a
physical impairment that substantially limited one or more
major life activities. 6' Alternatively, the employer could
assume that a person was substantially limited in one or
more major life activities while the person had an impairment
that was not limiting.62 In either situation, a covered entity
must have misperceived an individual's circumstances.6 ' The
Court stated that misperceptions are generally driven by
"stereotypic assumptions."64
The Sutton sisters contended that United misperceived
their condition and thought it would affect their job
performance.65 Arguably, United relied on a stereotype that
ultimately prevented the sisters from seeking a broad range
of employment.66 The sisters claimed that the mere existence
of uncorrected vision requirements indicated that United
believed that anyone with severe vision impairments were, in
effect, substantially limited.67 United protested, arguing that
it did not exclude them from a broad range of jobs, so it did
not substantially limit the ability of the sisters to work.68
The Court sided with United and held that it was within
an employer's discretion to determine the desirable
characteristics of potential employees.69  Essentially, an
employer may prefer some physical attributes or
58. Id. at 476.
59. Id. at 477.
60. Id. at 489. The Supreme Court determined that the sisters were not
actually disabled before it considered their claim of perceived disability. Id.
61. Id.
62. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 490.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999). The sisters
claimed that denying them positions as "global airline pilots" excluded them
from a class of employment. Id. United argued that this did not constitute a
class of employment and the sisters were not "regarded as substantially limited
in the major life activity of working." Id.
69. Id.
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characteristics so long as the characteristics do not constitute
a disability. 70 For example, an employer may make a hiring
decision based on a person's height or build since it was not a
disability.71 The Court concluded that eyesight requirement
was comparable to height and should therefore be treated
similarly.72 Thus, United was free to choose not to hire the
sisters because their vision was not a disability.7 3
The Court further concluded that a condition must
"substantially limit a major life activity" to be considered a
disability.74 If the major life activity is working, a plaintiff
must show that he or she has been unable to work in a
variety of jobs to constitute a substantial limitation. 75 Based
on this determination, the Court held that the complaint of
the sisters was insufficient.76 By not hiring them as global
airline pilots, United did not deny the sisters work in a
variety of jobs.7 The sisters could have become copilots or
worked for another airline.78  "An otherwise valid job
requirement, such as a height requirement, does not become
invalid simply because it would limit a person's employment
opportunities in a substantial way if it were adopted by a
substantial number of employers." 79 The Court proceeded to
dispose of the perceived disability claim because the sisters
did not prove that United's vision requirement reflected a
belief that poor uncorrected vision was a substantial
limitation. 0
3. Backlash Against Sutton
Organizations and legislators, advocating the extension
of comprehensive rights to the disabled, voiced their
dissatisfaction with Sutton. The National Council on
Disability ("NCD"),8l the current House Democratic Majority
70. Id.
71. Id. at 490-91.
72. See id. at 491.
73. See id.
74. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
75. Id. at 491.
76. Id. at 492-93.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 493. The Court refused to assume that the women would not have
been hired by a different airline. Id.
79. Id. at 493-94.
80. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 494 (1999).
81. Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 8-12.
20101 263
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Leader, 2 and the former legislator who drafted the original
ADA 3 expressed their outrage for the limiting effect of this
decision.
The NCD openly lamented Sutton's holdings.84 Its major
objection was that Sutton required plaintiffs to delve into a
defendant's thoughts. 85 According to the NCD, this undercut
the purpose of the ADA by making it extremely difficult for
plaintiffs to bring a claim absent an admission of the nature
of a defendant's motivations. 6  Additionally, the NCD
interpreted Sutton as denying relief to those who successfully
mitigated their impairment.8 ' The Court refused to find that
a person who mitigated their condition might still be a victim
of discrimination."8 Next, the NCD disagreed with the finding
that "a person has not been regarded as being substantially
limited in the major life activity of working unless the person
can demonstrate that the employer considered him or her as
being unable to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range
of jobs in various classes." 9 Lastly, it opposed the limitation
of perceived disabilities to those who were mistakenly
considered as having a substantially limiting impairment.9 °
The NCD was outraged that the Supreme Court would so
greatly restrict the application of the ADA when it was
passed to protect a broad group of individuals with
disabilities.91
Steny Hoyer, the current House Democratic Majority
Leader, voiced his concerns with Sutton's restrictive
interpretation of the ADA.92 Hoyer insisted that the impetus
82. Hoyer, supra note 40; Hoyer, supra note 41. At the time Hoyer authored
the article and made the speech cited here, he was the Democratic Minority
Whip. Hoyer, supra note 40.
83. Americans with Disabilities Act: Sixteen Years Later: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
26-41 (2006) (statement of Tony Coelho, Chair of the Epilepsy Foundation and
former Representative in Congress).
84. Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 8-9.
85. Id. at 8-10.
86. Id. at 10.
87. Id. at 8-9.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 9 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 493-94
(1999)).
90. Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 9.
91. Id. at 12.
92. Hoyer, supra note 41.
264 [Vol:50
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for enacting the ADA was the prevention of discrimination.93
When Congress included the definition of perceived disability,
it aimed to overcome society's negative perception of
disability.94 Today, Hoyer claims that "it was important [to
the legislature] to protect not only people who had genuine
trouble functioning normally, but also people whose
employers might wrongly perceive [them] as being
substantially impaired."95 The Supreme Court ignored this
purpose and focused on whether or not a person's impairment
fell under the Court's self-determined definition of
disability.96 Hoyer disagreed with Sutton and thought that
the Court should have allowed protection for those who
successfully mitigated their condition. Additionally, he
disliked what he deemed the Court's arbitrary provision of its
own definition of "substantially limited."97 In sum, Hoyer
believed that the Sutton decision failed to acknowledge the
"regarded as" prong,9 which he believed was meant to protect
a broader swath of individuals. 99
Tony Coelho, the original sponsor of the ADA, has also
discussed his concerns about the courts tendency to narrow
the scope of the ADA. 100 Congressman Coelho suffered from
epilepsy and mitigated his condition with medication, so
when he drafted the ADA, he intended for the bill to protect
those who mitigated their condition.'' Because the courts
considered epilepsy an "episodic disability," Coelho would not
be considered disabled under the law he drafted. 10 2 Coelho
even went so far as to state that the courts "were smoking
something" when they interpreted the ADA in this manner. 103
He argued that the courts have slowly eroded the protected
class by adopting narrow limitations on who may be








100. Americans with Disabilities Act: Sixteen Years Later, supra note 83, at
35.
101. Id. at 27-28.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 70.
104. Id. at 35.
2010]
266 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:50
extremely difficult for a plaintiff to bring a claim under the
ADA, and therefore, discrimination was going unpunished. 10 5
Undoubtedly, the original ADA brought about
monumental change in the area of disability
discrimination."0 6  Although this is an impressive
achievement, the promise of protection from discrimination
based on disability was unduly restricted by the "particularly
egregious" Supreme Court decision in Sutton"°7 and the
general trend of the some courts to narrowly define perceived
disability.' 8 A circuit split over the definition of perceived
disability only fueled the impassioned disagreement over the
interpretation of the ADA.
C. The Circuit Split over how to Interpret Perceived Disability
Sutton's aftermath created a confusing atmosphere that
ultimately led to lower court conclusions that seemed counter
to the purposes of the ADA.'0 9 Consequently, a circuit split
developed over whether a person who was "regarded as"
disabled was entitled to reasonable accommodation.
The First, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits broadly
interpreted the ADA when determining whether a plaintiff
could make a claim based on perceived disability."0 These
105. Id.
106. Hoyer, supra note 40.
107. Id.
108. Americans with Disabilities Act: Sixteen Years Later, supra note 83, at
35.
109. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 2(a)(6), 122
Stat. 3553, 3553.
110. See Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 675 (10th Cir. 2005)
(interpreting the ADA as protecting those with perceived disabilities the same
as those with actual disabilities); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't,
380 F.3d 751, 767 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that the plaintiff showed there was an
issue of fact in determining that the defendant "regarded him as being
substantially limited in the major life activity of working"); Rossbach v. City of
Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004) (indicating that a plaintiff must
show that the perceived disability involves a major life activity and it is
substantially limiting to proceed under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA);
Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[Bloth the language and
the policy of the statute seem . . . to offer protection . . . to one who is not
substantially disabled or even disabled at all but is wrongly perceived to be
so."). Although Katz was decided before Sutton, it was still an integral case that
comprised part of the circuit split. See Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d
1226, 1231, 1231 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the First Circuit in Katz
assumed a plaintiff "regarded as" disabled was entitled to reasonable
accommodation).
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circuits generally accepted that an individual could be
"regarded as" disabled in three instances.11' The first
occurred when an individual had an impairment that was not
substantially limiting but was treated by his or her employer
as a substantially limiting impairment." 2  The second took
place when an individual had an impairment that was
substantially limiting only because of the attitudes others
held towards that impairment." 3 Third, a plaintiff may have
a perceived disability if he or she did not have a substantially
limiting impairment, but was treated as if he or she did."4 In
addition to employing a broad analysis when determining if
an individual was "regarded as" disabled, these circuits
determined that a finding of perceived disability could entitle
a plaintiff to reasonable accommodation under the ADA."'
The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits limited
protection of plaintiffs with perceived disabilities by narrowly
111. Williams, 380 F.3d at 767; see also Kelly, 410 F.3d at 675 n.5; D'Angelo
v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1228 (11th Cir. 2005); Katz, 87 F.3d at
32.
112. Williams, 380 F.3d at 766; see also Kelly, 410 F.3d at 675 n.5; DAngelo,
422 F.3d at 1228; Katz, 87 F.3d at 32.
113. Williams, 380 F.3d at 766; see also D'Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1228; Katz, 87
F.3d at 32.
114. Williams, 380 F.3d at 766; see also Kelly, 410 F.3d at 675 n.5; D'Angelo,
422 F.3d at 1228; Katz, 87 F.3d at 32.
115. In Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., the Tenth Circuit recognized that there
was no statutory distinction between those who are actually disabled and those
who are "regarded as disabled" and therefore those with perceived disabilities
were entitle to reasonable accommodation. 410 F.3d at 676. The Tenth Circuit
then took issue with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the ADA and stated
that Congress did not think that allowing reasonable accommodation to those
with perceived disabilities would result in the "bizarre" results. Id. In D'Angelo
v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit found that "[t]he text of this
statute simply offers no basis for differentiating among the three types of
disabilities in determining which are entitled to a reasonable accommodation
and which are not." 422 F.3d at 1236. Accordingly, the court allowed the
plaintiff to bring her case because it presented a material issue of fact. Id. at
1240. In Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department, the
plaintiff was unable to carry a weapon due to mental condition. 380 F.3d at
766. The defendant dismissed him because they misunderstood his limitation
and thought he could not work near those who carried guns and therefore could
not perform any function of his job. Id. The Third Circuit determined that
those with actual disabilities as well as those with perceived disabilities were
entitled to reasonable accommodation. Id. at 774. In Katz v. City Metal Co., the
First Circuit assumed that a "regarded as" disabled plaintiff was entitled to
reasonable accommodation. D'Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1235 (discussing the circuit
split).
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interpreting disability.116 In Newberry v. East Texas State
University, for example, the Fifth Circuit was unconvinced by
a terminated professor's allegations that the university
discriminated against him because of his mental disability. 117
The Fifth Circuit required the plaintiff to show that the
perception of disability was the motivating factor for his
dismissal."' Therefore, the court demanded a showing of the
employer's rationale, which Newberry could not accomplish. " 9
In Weber v. Strippit, Inc., the Eighth Circuit added to
Newberry's requirements. 20 The plaintiff argued that he
need only show that he was discriminated against on the
basis of an impairment.2 ' The Eighth Circuit disagreed,
holding that the plaintiff must show not only that he was
dismissed on the basis of his impairment, but also that his
employer thought his impairment substantially limited one or
more major life activities.2 2
Additionally, these circuits limited the application of the
ADA by refusing to extend reasonable accommodation to
those who proved they were "regarded as" disabled.'23 In
Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, the Ninth Circuit held
that a misdiagnosed peace officer could not bring a claim for
reasonable accommodation based on a perceived disability. 24
The officer was misdiagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis after
an injury he sustained during training, and was terminated
because his doctor concluded he could no longer fire a gun.'2 5
The Ninth Circuit held that, although there was textual
support for a broad interpretation, "[t]he ADA cannot
reasonably have been intended to create a disparity in
116. See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
117. Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 1998).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 915 (8th Cir. 1999).
121. Id. Weber, the plaintiff, was hired as an international sales manager.
Id. at 910. After three years of employment, Weber suffered a major heart
attack, after which, his doctor imposed strict physical limitations. Id. Although
Weber was hospitalized for heart disease, hypertension, and anxiety, he
continued to perform his job responsibilities. Id. The defendant eventually
required Weber to relocate or accept a position at a much lower salary even
though his doctor instructed him to remain in Minnesota for six months. Id.
122. Id. at 915.
123. See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
124. Kaplan v. City ofN. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir. 2003).
125. Id. at 1227, 1229.
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treatment among impaired but non-disabled employees,
denying most the right to reasonable accommodations but
granting to others[] because of their employers'
misperceptions."12' The Kaplan court refused to hold that an
individual who was "regarded as" disabled had the same right
to reasonable accommodation as those with actual
disabilities.'27
Much like the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit found
that "[i]mposing liability on employers who fail to
accommodate non-disabled employees who are simply
regarded as disabled would lead to bizarre results."28
Accordingly, this circuit refused to require accommodation for
an employee who was terminated after refusing to relocate
based on advice from his doctor after a major heart attack. 129
In Workman v. Frito-Lay, the Sixth Circuit followed similar
reasoning and held that a worker with irritable bowel
syndrome was not entitled to reasonable accommodation. 0
These decisions, along with Sutton, formed the basis for
interpretation of the ADA until the ADA Amendments Act
was enacted in 2009.131
D. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008
Fortunately for those who were outraged by the limiting
decisions of the courts, "[i]n matters of statutory
interpretation, unlike constitutional matters, Congress has
the last word.' ' 2 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 passed
easily through Congress; 33 was signed into law on September
126. Id. at 1232 (quoting Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir.
1999).
127. Id.
128. Weber, 186 F.3d at 916.
129. Id. at 917.
130. Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999). On an
appeal by Frito-Lay, the court limited reasonable accommodation to those with
actual disabilities. Id. Individuals who were "regarded as" disabled were only
entitled to protection insofar as the defendant was not permitted to fire an
employee it "regarded as" disabled if that employee did not require reasonable
accommodation to perform the essential functions of the position. Id.
131. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 8, 122 Stat.
3553, 3559.
132. Hoyer, supra note 41.
133. See Senate Measure Would Expand Disabilities Act, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 12,
2008, at A16. The ADAAA passed through the Senate on a voice vote without
dissent and through the House of Representatives with a vote of 402 to
seventeen. Id.
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25, 2008; and went into effect on January 1, 2009.3
The ADAAA addresses most of the legislative concerns
about prior judicial interpretations of the ADA.135 Although
Congress did not change the wording of the definition of
disability,13 it added a section that further defined perceived
disability. 137 This section states that the requirements of
proving a perceived disability are met when an "individual
establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action
prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or
perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life
activity."138  The ADAAA includes instructions for
understanding the definition of disability,3 9 including a
requirement to interpret the definition broadly so as to be
applicable to the maximum extent possible.140  Congress
bolstered this by rejecting the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Sutton, and reinstating Arline as the applicable standard
when interpreting the definition of disability.14 ' The ADAAA
limits on perceived disability status should not be afforded to
those with "transitory impairments," which the Amendments
define as lasting for six months or less. 4 1 In passing the
Amendments, Congress intended to reestablish a broad scope
of protection under the ADA.143
Although Congress explicitly required a broad
interpretation of perceived disability, it chose not to require
employers to reasonably accommodate individuals "regarded
134. Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Notice
Concerning the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Amendments Act of 2008
(Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/amendments-notice.html.
135. See Hoyer, supra note 40. Hoyer stated that he wanted Congress to
amend the ADA to abolish interpretational traps that limit the effectiveness of
the ADA and include a section that instructed that the ADA should be
interpreted broadly. Id.
136. See Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
supra note 134.
137. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec 4(a), § 3(3), 122
Stat. 3553, 3555.
138. Id.
139. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(A).
140. Id.
141. Id. sec. 2(b)(3).
142. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(B).
143. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 2(b)(1)-(2), 122
Stat. 3553, 3554.
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as" disabled."' The ADAAA provided that a "covered
entity ... need not provide a reasonable accommodation or a
reasonable modification to policies, practices, or procedures to
an individual who meets the definition of disability in section
12102(1) of this title solely under subparagraph (C)." 145
Although Congress offered no articulation of its reasons for
this decision, assumedly, this section was meant to resolve
the circuit split over whether a defendant must provide
reasonable accommodation to those with perceived
disabilities.
Generally, the Amendments change how the definition of
disability should be interpreted.146  In addition, the ADAAA
states that an impairment that is episodic or in remission
should be found to be a disability if it would be considered a
disability when active,147  and instructs that mitigating
measures, other than eyeglasses or contact lenses, should not
be considered when determining whether a person has a
disability. 4  The ADAAA expanded on the definition of major
life activities by including a list of major life activities and
major bodily functions. 149
144. Id. sec. 6(a)(1), § 501(h).
145. Id.
146. See Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
supra note 134.
147. ADA Amendments Act sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(D).
148. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(E)(i). Examples mitigating measures that should not
be considered are "medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances, low-
vision devices (which do not include ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses),
prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing aids and cochlear implants or
other implantable hearing devices, mobility devices, or oxygen therapy
equipment and supplies." Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(E)(i)(I). Additionally, the courts
should not consider "use of assistive technology," "reasonable accommodations
or auxiliary aids or services," and "learned behavioral or adaptive neurological
modifications." Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(E)(i)(II)-(IV).
149. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(2). This section states that major life activities "include,
but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
working." Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(A). "[M]ajor life activity also includes the
operation of a major bodily function including, but are not limited to, functions
of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder,
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive
functions." Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(B). Because the impact of these changes is not
yet clear, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will be evaluating
the "impact of these changes on its enforcement guidances [sic] and other
publications addressing the ADA" so as to properly enforce the Amendments.
See Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, supra
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III. THE PROBLEM
Courts found it difficult to interpret the ADA's definition
of disability. 15 0 The Supreme Court restricted the application
of perceived disabilities, 5' and the circuit courts split over
whether to apply the ADA broadly or narrowly when allowing
for reasonable accommodation. 5 2  Although the ADAAA
appears to have clearly addressed these problems,'53 the
Amendments do not cure every flaw that previously allowed
the courts to make these decisions.' Because the ADAAA
has only recently come into effect, it is unclear how the courts
will interpret the language of the Amendments and how their
interpretations will affect claims based on perceived disability
in the future. While it is likely that the Amendments were
meant to be comprehensive, it is uncertain if the original
intent of Congress in passing the ADA will be realized.
IV. ANALYSIS
The ADAAA has been touted as legislation that will
reinstate the broad scope of protection Congress intended
under the original ADA.'55 Because this legislation has only
recently gone into effect, and there are no judicial
interpretations of the newly altered definition of perceived
disability, it is unclear how courts will interpret the
Amendments. 56 A topic that might spur future litigation is
the interpretation of the original definition of perceived
disability, while considering the supplemental definition
added by the ADAAA.'57 Additionally, there may be litigation
note 134.
150. See supra Parts II.B.2, II.C.
151. See supra Part II.B.2.
152. See supra Part II.C.
153. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 6(a)(1), §
501(h), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.
154. See infra Part IV.
155. ADA Amendments Act sec. 2(b)(1); see supra note 133.
156. Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, supra
note 134. As of the time this comment was published, courts had only
considered whether the ADAAA applied retroactively. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Nat.
Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, No. 08-5371, 2009 WL 331368, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 11,
2009) (finding the ADAAA applied retroactively to a claim for prospective relief
because there would be no injustice in applying the ADAAA); Kirkeberg v.
Canadian Pac. Ry., No. 07-4621, 2009 WL 169403, at *5 n.7 (D. Minn. Jan. 26,
2009) (finding the ADAAA did not apply retroactively).
157. See infra Part IV.A.
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disputing the nature of Congressional intent because the
Amendments do not require reasonable accommodation for
those "regarded as" disabled.' These areas of interpretation
are unsettled and, in future litigation, could once again result
in deep disagreement over how to interpret the ADA.
A. Definitions of Perceived Disability: New and Old
The ADAAA did not change the basic definition of
disability.159 Instead, the Amendments added a supplemental
definition of "regarded as having such an impairment."60
This new section states:
An individual meets the requirement of "being regarded as
having such an impairment" if the individual establishes
that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited
under this Act because of an actual or perceived physical
or mental impairment whether or not the impairment
limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.' 6 '
Prior to the Amendments, courts focused on determining
whether a plaintiff had a disability within the meaning of the
ADA. 162 Employers litigated this issue extensively because it
was an opportunity to end an ADA claim at an early stage. 16 3
With the passing of the ADAAA, the focus of the definition of
perceived disability has shifted from whether a person was
considered disabled to the existence of discrimination on the
basis of a perceived disability. 164 This shift reflects the intent
of legislature as calling on courts focus on discrimination
instead of whether an individual fits under a narrowly
interpreted definition of disability. 16
Despite Congress's attempt to focus ADA litigation on
discrimination, there are two potential areas of confusion that
remain. First, the basic definition of perceived disability
incorporates language from the definition of actual
158. See infra Part IV.B.
159. See ADA Amendments Act sec. 4(a), § 3(1). The ADAA changed only the
location of the definition of disability and included a reference to a
supplemental definition of perceived disability. Id.
160. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3).
161. Id.
162. Thomas D'Agostino, Defining "Disability" Under the ADA: 1997 Update,
NAT'L DISABILITY L. REP. i, i (1997).
163. Id.
164. See ADA Amendments Act sec. 4(a), § 3(3).
165. See Hoyer, supra note 40; Hoyer, supra note 41.
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disability.'66 An actual disability is defined as "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities."67 The definition of perceived disability
refers to "such an impairment" which ties this definition to
the definition of actual disability. 168 Prior to the
Amendments, the United States Supreme Court and the
Courts of Appeals deduced that the phrase "such an
impairment" in the definition of perceived disability referred
to the definition of actual disability. 69  While the ADAAA
explicitly states that the courts should no longer rely on the
Sutton's rationale, 71 it is inconceivable that the courts would
not similarly interpret the wording in the basic definition of
perceived disability.
The Amendments did not alter the language that led to
this inference; 17' instead, they include an additional definition
that is contradictory to this interpretation. 172  This new
definition states that requirements of a perceived disability
claim are satisfied "whether or not the impairment limits or
is perceived to limit a major life activity."1 73  Although the
ADAAA is to be construed broadly enough to be applicable to
the maximum extent possible, 74 this may not be sufficient to
block courts from applying a stricter standard than Congress
intended. Conceivably, the courts could find that Congress
made an error in including these contradictory definitions in
the ADAAA and interpret the definition of disability in
numerous ways. By not changing the wording of the third
prong's definition of disability,175 Congress allowed for the
possibility that a circuit may impose a stricter limitation on
166. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
167. ADA Amendments Act sec. 4(a), § 3(1)(A).
168. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(1)(B)-(C).
169. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489; see also Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d
670, 675 (10th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d
751, 766 (3d Cir. 2004); Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1357 (11th
Cir. 2004); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1996). In Sutton, the
Court held that the definition of perceived disability "provides that having a
disability includes 'being regarded as having' 'a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual.'" Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 (citations omitted).
170. ADA Amendments Act sec. 2(b)(2)-(3).
171. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(1)(C).
172. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3).
173. Id.
174. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(A).
175. See id. sec. 4(a), § 3(1)(C).
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perceived disability than it intended.
Even if the courts apply an entirely new standard,
unrelated to the definition of actual disability, the courts will
have carte blanche to interpret the meaning of "impairment"
from the ADAAA's additional definition. 176 Congress does not
define "impairment" without reference to actual disability.1 77
Therefore, courts will need to police the distinction between
an "impairment" and any other sort of condition that a court
may believe does not rise to the level of an "impairment."
This will force the courts to either devise their own definition
of "impairment," or find that any condition can be considered
an "impairment" for purposes of bringing a claim under the
amended definition of disability.
A second possible ambiguity involves the language of the
section added by the ADAAA defining a perceived
disability.1 7 ' The specific language at issue is "because of an
actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or
not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life
activity."1 79  A question of whether this language can be
interpreted as referring generally to any impairment an
employer or other covered entity may suspect, or whether
there must be a specific impairment in mind has risen.8 0
Interpretation of this section may allow for the employer's
mindset to return to the definition of perceived disability,
leaving the ADA powerless to stop employers who
unconsciously discriminate."' Although it is unclear whether
Congress meant to punish unconscious discrimination, if this
was one of its aims, it should have included an explanation to
that effect.
176. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). Sutton
defined "such an impairment" based on the definition of actual disability by
incorporating the language "major life activity" and "substantially limits" into
the Court's definition of a perceived disability. Id. Thus, the prior judicial
decisions offer no guidance of how a perceived impairment should be defined
when it is no longer linked to the definition of actual disability.
177. See ADA Amendments Act sec. 4(a), § 3(3).
178. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(A).
179. Id.
180. Dale Larson, Unconsciously Regarded as Disabled: Implicit Bias and the
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B. The Impact of Lack of Reasonable Accommodation to
Those with Perceived Disabilities
The debate over reasonable accommodation resulted in a
circuit split. Circuits that interpreted perceived disability
broadly also found plaintiffs who were "regarded as" disabled
were entitled to reasonable accommodation. Those circuits
that restricted the application of the ADA did not allow for
reasonable accommodation.8 2  In passing the ADAAA,
Congress jumbled these decisions by calling for a broad
interpretation of perceived disability, while not allowing
reasonable accommodation for successful plaintiffs under this
prong. 183
The restriction seems counter to the overarching intent of
the ADAAA--"reinstating a broad scope of protection."8 4 It
not only distorts Congressional intent, but creates a puzzling
situation for the courts because although more claims can
assumedly be litigated, there will fewer remedies available. 8 5
Furthermore, the denial of reasonable accommodation is
troublesome because it goes against the great weight of ADA
scholarship that saw no distinction between actual and
perceived disability when it came to reasonable
accommodation.8 6  Congress apparently agreed with the
182. See supra Part II.C.
183. See supra Part II.D.
184. ADA Amendments Act sec. 2(b)(1).
185. See id. sec. 6(a)(1), § 501(h).
186. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Anderson, What is "Because of the Disability" Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation,
and the Windfall Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 361-74 (2006)
(stating, amongst other things, that "[there is no statutory basis for denying
reasonable accommodation to employees regarded as having a disability because
the court categorically finds such accommodations insufficiently connected to
disability"); Matthew M. Cannon, Mending a Monumental Mountain: Resolving
Two Critical Circuit Splits Under the Americans with Disabilities Act for the
Sake of Logic, Unity, and the Mentally Disabled, 2006 BYU L. REV. 529, 566
(arguing that the Supreme Court of the United States should have resolved the
circuit split "by recognizing an employer's duty to reasonably accommodate
employees perceived as disabled"); Daniel Egan, The Dwindling Class of
"Disabled Individuals": An Exemplification of the Americans with Disabilities
Act's Inadequacies in D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
491, 513 (2007) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit "correctly answered in the
affirmative the question of whether a 'regarded as' disabled individual is
entitled to reasonable accommodations"); Elizabeth Mills, How Bizarre? The
Application of Reasonable Accommodation to Employees "Regarded As" Disabled
Under the ADA Does Not Necessarily Lead To Bizarre Results, 75 MISS. L.J.
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Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits' determination that
allowing reasonable accommodation for those who were
"regarded as" disabled would be bizarre.8 7
C. How the Decisions Will Be Different Under the ADAAA
The provision of an additional definition of perceived
disability in the ADAAA indicates that the courts should
allow more cases to go forward.' The extensive new
definition seems to extend past even the broad
interpretations of the First, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits."8 9 Under the ADAAA, the decisions of the Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits will not likely be followed
in the future because the plaintiffs now meet the "regarded
as" disabled requirement, as amended by the ADAAA.' 90 The
teacher with mental problems in Newberry, 9' the worker
with irritable bowel syndrome in Workman,92 the heart
attack victim who refused to relocate in Weber,'9' and the
misdiagnosed peace officer in Kaplan,'94 all appear able to
bring cases under the ADAAA 19  because the focus of the
definition of perceived disability is discrimination.' 96
Although much has been made of the former
interpretations of the ADA, it is unclear whether much
significant change will result. One considerable result is that
cases requesting only reasonable accommodation to remedy
1063, 1074-75 (2006) ('Based on the legislative history, the plain meaning of
the text, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act ...
the ADA's intent was to offer protection and reasonable accommodation to
individuals 'regarded as' disabled."); Austin Ozawa, Reasonable Accommodation
for Those "Regarded As" Disabled: Why Requiring It Will Create Positive
Incentives for Employers, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 313, 329-37 (stating that "a
thorough examination of the legislative intent provides further support for an
obligation to reasonably accommodate"); Sarah J. Parrot, The ADA and
Reasonable Accommodation of Employees Regarded As Disabled: Statutory Fact
or Bizarre Fiction?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1495, 1526-32 (2006) (advocating the
widespread acceptance of the rationale of the Third Circuit).
187. See supra Part II.C.
188. See ADA Amendments Act sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(A).
189. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3).
190. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(A); see infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
191. Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 1998).
192. Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1999).
193. Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 910 (8th Cir. 1999).
194. Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir. 2003).
195. See ADA Amendments Act sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(A).
196. See id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3).
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discrimination based on perceived disabilities can no longer
survive pretrial motions in any circuit because it does not
state a claim that is entitled to relief.197  Additionally,
whether the claims brought by plaintiffs who are "regarded
as" disabled under the amended definition will succeed at
trial remains to be seen. If the perceived disability does not,
as was formerly required, substantially limit one or more
major life activities, the judge or jury might not find
discrimination because for a minor condition may not
logically give rise to discrimination. Ultimately, the
likelihood of success when bringing an ADA claim might not
be greatly increased by the changes made by the ADAAA.
The ADAAA's effect will only be determined as new cases are
litigated.
V. PROPOSAL
Even though the ADAAA was recently enacted, Congress
may still want to change some facets of the Amendments to
ensure that it is applied according to its intent. Changing the
basic definition of disability would elucidate Congressional
intent and curtail potential confusion over the definition's
wording. Congress seems apprehensive to change the basic
definition of disability. When the ADA was first written, the
drafters employed the definition of handicap from the
Rehabilitation Act to define disability under the ADA. 198
Legislators insist that this was done to promote
consistency, 99 but even though the definition failed to achieve
that goal, Congress avoided changing the definition seemingly
out of fear of how the courts might interpret a new definition.
Congress indicated the changes desired, but these changes
may be insufficient. Changing the organization of the ADA,200
noting that the definition of disability should be broadly
construed,20 ' and adding a definition of a perceived
disability20 2 might still allow the courts to confine the scope of
the ADAAA.
197. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
198. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 21 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(11), at 50
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332.
199. Hoyer, supra note 40; Hoyer, supra note 41.
200. ADA Amendments Act sec. 4(a), § 3(1)(C).
201. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(A).
202. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(A).
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Congress should amend the definition of perceived
disability to avoid potential confusion.2 °3 Such a change
should eliminate any reference to the definition of actual
disability to circumvent any confusion related to this
language. This will also reinforce the broad standard
Congress wished to reinstate when passing the ADAAA.2 °4
Congress can revise the definition by replacing its reference
to "such an impairment" with a reference to "a mental or
physical impairment." This will then define perceived
disability as "being regarded as having a physical or mental
impairment." This definition will turn the focus to
discrimination while ensuring that it will be interpreted
broadly because it will no longer refer to the definition of
actual disability. Congress can also separately define
"impairment," or "mental or physical impairment" to restrict
the latitude given to the courts.
Courts can confront this confusion when determining
how to interpret "such an impairment." The ADAAA was
meant to extend the protection available under the ADA;211
accordingly, the courts should interpret this language broadly
so as not to use "such an impairment" to limit coverage. The
courts can come to this determination in a number of ways.
First, the courts can conclude that "such an impairment" only
refers to "a physical or mental impairment" from the
definition of actual disability, instead of the entire first prong
definition. This will alleviate problems of interpretation
while still allowing "such an impairment" to refer to the
definition of actual disability. Secondly, the courts can find
that Congress made a mistake when it left "such an
impairment" in the definition of perceived disability because
it contradicts the newly added definition of perceived
disability. Congress may have overlooked the fact that the
courts have implied that this phrase referred to "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limited one or more of
the major life activities."20 6 Lastly, the courts can find that
Congress was apprehensive about changing the basic
definition of disability, so the inconsistent language that
caused confusion was not meant to be controlling. Therefore,
203. See supra Part IV.A.
204. See ADA Amendments Act sec. 2(b)(1).
205. See id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(A).
206. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
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the courts can ignore the inclusion of "such an impairment"
and only interpret the new supplemental definition of
"regarded as" disabled. These alternatives will ultimately
have the same effect as if Congress had amended the
definition to exclude "such an impairment."
No court can logically interpret the ADAAA to provide
reasonable accommodation to those "regarded as" disabled.
Congress should seriously reconsider its denial of reasonable
accommodation 07 because it seems inconsistent with its
concern with broadly interpreting perceived disability. There
may be situations where reasonable accommodation could be
appropriate, but the courts do not have the discretion to grant
it. Congress can limit the application of reasonable
accommodation to those "regarded as" disabled without
entirely excluding it. The ADAAA could have stated that
reasonable accommodation was not generally available for
plaintiffs who were "regarded as" disabled, but set some
exceptions for situations where the courts may find it in the
interest of justice and fairness that the plaintiff be
accommodated. This would allow for judicial discretion in
deciding whether reasonable accommodation is warranted.
VI. CONCLUSION
The battle over the interpretation of the ADAAA is just
beginning. By including language that appears contradictory,
Congress may have allowed some circuits to interpret the
definition of perceived disability narrowly,2 8 and by not
providing reasonable accommodation for those who are
"regarded as" disabled, less discrimination will be
punished.20 9 Ultimately, legislators will only be able to see
the results of the ADAAA after cases are brought under these
new sections.
207. See ADA Amendments Act sec. 6(a)(1), § 501(h).
208. See supra Part IV.A.
209. See supra Part IV.B.
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